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Main page | Seminars and Conferences | NES/CEFIR Research Seminars | Seminars' archive
Seminars 2007 | 30-12-2007
 
December 27, 2007 — Job Market Seminar
Ruben Enikolopov (PhD Harvard 2008 expected)
«Politicians, Bureaucrats and Patronage»

December 26, 2007 — Job Market Seminar
Maria Petrova (PhD Harvard 2008 expected)
«Newspapers and Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an Independent Press»

December 25, 2007 — Job Market Seminar
Andrey Stoyanov (PhD University of British Columbia 2008 expected)
«Trade Policy of a Free Trade Agreement in the Presence of Foreign Lobbying»

December 20, 2007 — Job Market Seminar
Sergei Izmalkov (PhD Penn State 2002, Assistant Professor at MIT)
«Perfect Implementation of Mediated Normal-Form Mechanisms»

December 19, 2007
Dmitriy Stolyarov (University of Michigan)
«Inequality in Russia during 1994-2005»

December 18, 2007 — Job Market Seminar
Scott Nicholson (PhD Stanford 2008 expected)
«The Effects of Choice Context on Decision-Making: An Application to Voter Fatigue»

December 12, 2007, 14.00, r.720
Victoria Dobrynskaya (ICEF at HSE)
«The implications of the asymmetric price rigidity for the optimal monetary policy in an open economy and a cross-country evidence»

December 4, 2007
Professor Henry Brady (UC Berkeley) and Professor Cynthia Kaplan (UC Santa Barbara)
«Gathering Voices: Political Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet Union»

November 28, 2007
Yaroslav Volkov (CEFIR)
«Efficiency under Enforcement: Political Competition and Public Good Provision»

November 21, 2007 — Job Market Seminar
Tatiana Mikhailova (Boston University)
«Russian Urban System: Looking for Break Points»

November 14, 2007 
Alexander Matros (University of Pittsburg)
«Contests with a Stochastic Number of Players»

November 13, 2007
Vladimir Smirnov (Sydney University)
«Treasure Game»

November 7, 2007 — Job Market Seminar
Olesya Grishchenko (Penn State)
«Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumers: when the data has still to meet a theory it likes»

October 31, 2007
Sarah Wilson Sokhey (Ohio University )
«An Event History Analysis of Market Reforms in Post-Communist Countries»

October 22, 2007, Monday
Jan Magnus (Tilburg University)
«The efficiency of top agents: an analysis through service strategy in tennis»

October 17, 2007, Wednesday
Elchanan Ben-Porath (Hebrew University)
«Implementation with Evidence Disclosure''

October 15, 2007
Scott Gehlbach
«Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? State Bureaucracy and Privatization Effectiveness»

October 9, 2007, Tuesday
Russell Pittman
«Welfare Standards and Competition Law Enforcement»?

October 8, 2007, Monday, 12:30
Ted Gerber (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
«Markets, Performance, or Structure? Earnings Inequality Across Time and Space in Russia, 1991-2004»

October 4 (Thursday)
Ben Bental (University of Haifa)
«Declining Labor Shares and Bargaining Power: An Institutional Explanation»

September 24, 2007
Marcel Boyer (Montreal University)
«The Value of Real and Financial Risk Management»

September 20, 2007
Oleksiy Kryvtsov (Bank of Canada)
«Information Flows and Aggregate Persistence»

September 19, 2007
William Pyle (Middleberry)
«Organized Business, Political Regimes and Property Rights across the Russian Federation»

September 12, 2007
Michael Ostrovsky (Stanford)
«Strategic Proxy Voting»

August 21, 2007 
Prof. David Kreps (Stanford Graduate School of Business)
«Should promises be secured by liquidated damages agreements?"

August 21, 2007 
Prof. Joshua A. Tucker (New York University)
«Reflective and Unreflective Partisans? Experimental Evidence on the Links between Information, Opinion, and Party Identification»

August 20, 2007 
Prof. Anat Admati (Stanford Graduate School of Business)
«The „Wall Street Walk“ and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice»

August 17, 2007
Elena Panova (UCAM)
«Electoral Promises, Primaries, and Political Parties»

August 15, 2007 — CANCELLED
Michael Ostrovsky (Stanford Graduate School of Business)

August 8, 2007 — JMS
Natalia Volchkova (CEFIR)
«Human Capital, Industrial Growth and Resource Curse»

July 25, 2007
Georgy Artemov
«Robust Virtual Implementation: Toward Reinterpretation of Wilson Doctrine»

July 12, 2007
Prof. David Yermack (NYU Stern)
«Where are the Shareholders' Mansions? CEOs' Home Purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company Performance»

Abstract:
We study real estate purchases by major company CEOs, compiling a database of the principal residences of nearly every top executive in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index. When a CEO buys real estate, future company performance is inversely related to the CEO’s liquidation of company shares and options for financing the transaction. We also find that, regardless of the source of finance, future company performance deteriorates when CEOs acquire extremely large or costly mansions and estates. We therefore interpret large home acquisitions as signals of CEO entrenchment. Our research also provides useful insights for calibrating utility based models of executive compensation and for understanding patterns of Veblenian conspicuous consumption.


July 11, 2007
Marina Martynova (University of Sheffield)
«A Corporate Governance Index: Convergence and Diversity of National Corporate Governance Regulations»

July 4, 2007, 13:20, r.720
Maria Petrova (Harvard)
«Mass Media and Special Interest Groups»

June 27, 2007 , 13:20, r.720
Anna Mikusheva (Harvard)
«Uniform inference in autoregressive models»

June 20, 2007, 13:20, r.720
Nazrul Islam (International Center for the Study of East Asian Development, Kitakyushu, Japan)
«Viet Namís Lesson for China: An Examination of the Sachs-Woo Hypothesis»

June 7, 2007, Thursday, 13:20, r.720
Professor Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)
«Pricing in Matching Markets»

May 28, 2007, Monday, 12:00, r.720
Prof.Koen Schoors (University of Ghent)
«Bank supervision: Russian style»

May 23, 2007, 13:20, r. 720
Oleg Itskhoki (Harvard University)
«Trade and Employment»

May 16, 2007, 13.20, r.720
Pr. Andrei Simonov (Stokholm School of Economics)
«The Dark Role of Investment Banks in the Market for Corporate
Control»

April 20, 2007, Friday, 13.00, r.720,
Giulia Faggio (LSE) — Job Market Seminar
«Job Destruction, Job Creation and Unemployment in Transition Countries: What can we learn?"

April 19, 2007, 13.00, r.720
Andrei Sarychev (LSE)
«Bilateral investment with hold-up and renegotiation»

April 18, 2007, 13.20, r.720
Russell Pittman ( U.S. Department of Justice)
«Restructuring of the Russian electricity sector»

April 11, 2007, Wednesday, 13.20, r.720
Tymofiy Mylovanov (University of Bonn)
«Diverging Opinions»

Abstract
This paper suggests an explanation for the phenomenon of diverging opinions. We present a Bayesian model with two-dimensional uncertainty and multiple agents in which there is no prior disagreement about an optimal decision. Nevertheless, a disagreement among agents may arise and continually increase if additional information becomes available. The model provides testable implications about how occurrence of disagreement depends on the structure of new information. We verify our model experimentally by showing that disagreement is more likely to be observed in the experimental treatment than in the control treatment. Furthermore, in the experimental treatment, the disagreement tends to be \textit{larger} for the subjects whose behavior is more \textit{consistent} with Bayesian updating.

April 10, 2007, Tuesday, 13.20, r.720 — Job Market Seminar
Andrei Markevich (Warwick University)
«Soviet urban households and the road to universal employment, from the end of the 1930s to the end of the 1960s»

April 2, 2007, Monday, 13.20, r.720
Professor Bas Werker (Tilburg University)
«Causality Effects in Return Volatility Measures with Random Times»

Abstract
We provide a structural approach to identify instantaneous causality effects between quote-to-quote durations and stock price volatility. So far, in the literature, instantaneous causality effects have either been excluded or cannot be identified separately from Granger type causality effects. By
giving explicit moment conditions for observed returns over (random) duration intervals, we are able to identify an instantaneous causality effect, e.g., due to news events driving both surprises in durations and surprises in volatilities. We conclude that instantaneous volatility forecasts for, e.g., IBM stock returns must be decreased by as much as 40% when not having seen the next quote before its (conditionally) median time. For less liquidly traded stocks at NYSE this effect is even stronger. Also, instantaneous volatilities are found to be much higher than indicated by standard volatility assessment procedures. Finally, the documented causality effect has significant impact on statistical inference for tick-by-tick
data.

March 28, 2007, 13.20, r.720
Oleg Rytchkov (MIT)
«Filtering Out Expected Dividends and Expected Returns»

March 21, 2007, 13.20, r.720 
Rohit Rahi (LSE)
«Arbitrage Networks»

March 14, 2007, 13:20, r.720
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (NES, CEFIR)
«Deregulation of business»

Abstract
What determines the enforcement of deregulation reform of business
activities? What are the outcomes of deregulation? We address these questions using an episode of a drastic reform in Russia between 2001 and 2004 which liberalized registration, licensing, and inspections. Based on the analysis of micro-level panel data on regulatory burden, we find that:
1) The reform reduced administrative costs of firms, on average; but, the progress of reform had substantial geographical variation.
2) The enforcement of deregulation reform was better in regions with a transparent government, low corruption, strong fiscal incentives (i.e., reliance of local budgets on local taxes rather than fiscal transfers) and a powerful industrial lobby.
3) Using the exogenous variation in regulation generated by the interaction of reform and its institutional determinants, we find a substantial positive effect of deregulation on entry and small business employment and no effect on pollution and morbidity. The results support the «tollbooth» theory of the nature of regulation and are inconsistent with either the public interest theory or the regulatory capture theory.

March 7, 2007, 15:00, r.720
Prof. Paul R. Gregory (Hoover Institution) and Konstantin Sonin

March 1, 2007, 13:20, r.720
David Veredas (ECARE)
«Does the open limit order book matter in explaining long run volatility?"

Abstract
This paper evaluates the informational content of an open limit order book
by studying its role in explaining long run volatility. We separate liquidity-driven (transitory) volatility from information-driven (long run) volatility using a dynamic state-space co-integration model for ask and bid quotes. We find that changes in immediacy costs, for trades of different sizes, precede posterior fluctuations in long run volatility, even after controlling for the incoming order flow; the book is less informative for large-caps; its informativeness decreases with time aggregation, and the book beyond the best quotes adds explanatory power to the best quotes.


February 28, 2007
Anton Suvorov (NES and CEFIR) (joint with A. Akhmedov (CEFIR), 2006)
«Discretionary Acquisition of Firm-Specific Human Capital under Non-Verifiable Performance»

Abstract
The paper considers a two-period model, in which a worker hired by a firm in the first period acquires firm-specific human capital that increases the firm’s second-period profit. We assume that this investment is non-contractible, which implies a standard underinvestment result. However, the inability of the incumbent firm to observe second-period wage offers of potential raiders prevents it from complete expropriation of the surplus created by the worker’s investment; the worker is thus induced to make positive investment in equilibrium. Further, we assume that when hiring the worker, the firm can impose a lower bound on it’s second-period wage offers. We show that such policy destroys the worker’s incentives to acquire HC and is practiced only if the worker’s investment is sufficiently unproductive. We also consider an extension of the basic model, in which firms differ in the productivity of their employees efforts related to HC acquisition. To separate themselves and thus induce the employee to exert higher effort, more productive firms offer higher entry wages than the less productive ones, whereas under symmetric information they offer lower first-period wages. Furthermore, we show that the ability to impose a lower bound on second-period wages may allow the efficient firms to increase the entry wage to a smaller degree or even not increase it at all compared to the entry wage under symmetric information.


February 16, 2007, Friday,13.00-14.15, r.720 — Job Market Seminar
Georgy Artemov (Brown University)
«Imminent Nash Implemintation»

February 15, 2007, Thursday, 15.00-16.15, r.720 — Job Market Seminar
Anna Obizhaeva (MIT Sloan School of Management)
«Information vs. Liquidity: Evidence from Portfolio Transition Trades»

February 9, Friday, 13.00:14.15, r.720 — Job Market Seminar
Kathryn M. Kaminski (MIT Operations Research Center)
«When Do Stop-Loss Rules Stop Losses»

February 6, 2007, 3:15 p.m., room 720 — Job Market Seminar
Viktors Stebunovs (Boston College)
«Finance as a Barrier to Entry: U.S. Bank Deregulation and Volatility»

January 17, 2007 
Xin Zhang (UCLA)
«Legitimization of the illegitimate»
Seminars are held at 1.20 pm in the conference room (office 720), unless noted otherwise.

Seminars are open to the public.
For additional information please call: (495) 105 5002
Nakhimovsky prospect 47, office 920 & 720 117418 Moscow Russia
Phone: +7 (495) 925 5002 Fax: +7 (495) 925 5003
E-mail: cefir (at) cefir.ru
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Centre for Economic and Financial
Research